Comments on: Douglass North on “Understanding the Process of Economic Change” http://www.deeshaa.org/2005/03/31/douglass-north-on-understanding-the-process-of-economic-change/ Mon, 13 Feb 2012 05:41:09 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.9.2 hourly 1 By: Sri http://www.deeshaa.org/2005/03/31/douglass-north-on-understanding-the-process-of-economic-change/comment-page-1/#comment-711 Sri Unknown, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000 http://home.blogstreet.com/2005/03/31/284#comment-711 The distinction that Doug N draws rests on intentionality fueled by preferences. Philosophers have pondered whether such a thing as free will can be substantiated by logic or experience. The last 50 years of work in neurobiology casts doubt on the role of free will. Ramachandran (UCSD) in his Reith lectures at BBC discusses his findings - quite fascinating. http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2003/reith2003_lecture1_transcript.shtml The distinction that Doug N draws rests on intentionality fueled by preferences. Philosophers have pondered whether such a thing as free will can be substantiated by logic or experience. The last 50 years of work in neurobiology casts doubt on the role of free will. Ramachandran (UCSD) in his Reith lectures at BBC discusses his findings – quite fascinating.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2003/reith2003_lecture1_transcript.shtml

]]> By: Sanjay http://www.deeshaa.org/2005/03/31/douglass-north-on-understanding-the-process-of-economic-change/comment-page-1/#comment-712 Sanjay Unknown, 30 Nov -0001 00:00:00 +0000 http://home.blogstreet.com/2005/03/31/284#comment-712 I would say DN doesn't understand both intentionality and evolutionary theory. For one, Darwinian mechanisms have an "aboutness" and "looking forward" component, because organisms choose actions that are "about" survival. Intentions do the same, but in a more complex way, so the idea that intentions are somehow special to humans doesn't fly. Two, having intentions does not rule out Darwinian mechanisms. It would just be Darwinian mechanisms operating on intentional systems. Also, in many cases, non-intentional systems can, and do, co-exist besides intentional ones. So the strict distinction DN is pushing does not exist. There are also other views on the nature of beliefs, for instance the eliminative materialist idea that they don't exist, and the related view that they are rationalisation efforts generated after the fact. It has been shown that hypnotists can make people do weird things (like dancing or flapping their hands when the hypnotist snaps his fingers), and if you ask people why they did it, they will confabulate all kinds of weird rational-sounding reasons involving beliefs. (I suspect economists do this as well!:) Choices and decisions are separate from beliefs, and happen at the evolutionary level as well, and it has been shown that the mechanisms humans use to make choices and decisions are not all that different from the ones animals use. The underlying view DN is pushing, that man, particualrly economic man, is somehow special in terms of the mechanisms he uses for decision-making, is believed only by economists. The consensus view everywhere else is that there is a difference in degree, but not in category. As for free will, no one really knows what that is. Ramachandran is not exactly the best person to shed light on that issue, Dennett would be closer. Check out his book Elbow Room and the new one (Freedom Evolves). I would say DN doesn’t understand both intentionality and evolutionary theory. For one, Darwinian mechanisms have an “aboutness” and “looking forward” component, because organisms choose actions that are “about” survival. Intentions do the same, but in a more complex way, so the idea that intentions are somehow special to humans doesn’t fly. Two, having intentions does not rule out Darwinian mechanisms. It would just be Darwinian mechanisms operating on intentional systems. Also, in many cases, non-intentional systems can, and do, co-exist besides intentional ones. So the strict distinction DN is pushing does not exist. There are also other views on the nature of beliefs, for instance the eliminative materialist idea that they don’t exist, and the related view that they are rationalisation efforts generated after the fact. It has been shown that hypnotists can make people do weird things (like dancing or flapping their hands when the hypnotist snaps his fingers), and if you ask people why they did it, they will confabulate all kinds of weird rational-sounding reasons involving beliefs. (I suspect economists do this as well!:)

Choices and decisions are separate from beliefs, and happen at the evolutionary level as well, and it has been shown that the mechanisms humans use to make choices and decisions are not all that different from the ones animals use.

The underlying view DN is pushing, that man, particualrly economic man, is somehow special in terms of the mechanisms he uses for decision-making, is believed only by economists. The consensus view everywhere else is that there is a difference in degree, but not in category.

As for free will, no one really knows what that is. Ramachandran is not exactly the best person to shed light on that issue, Dennett would be closer. Check out his book Elbow Room and the new one (Freedom Evolves).

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